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THE CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF DANTE’S PURGATORY
It might appear straightforward, on a first reading, that Dante’s Purgatory 
represents a penitential journey guided by Christian ethics to God. For most 
of  the poem’s history, indeed, Purgatory has been read broadly in this way. In 
the second half  of  the twentieth century, however, a parallel interpretation 
emerged. Influenced by Dante’s dualistic theory of  man’s two ethical goals (one 
temporal and one eternal), many scholars have argued that Purgatory represents 
a secular journey guided by philosophical principles to a temporal happiness. 
This article presents three major counter-arguments to the secular reading of  
Purgatory, a reading proposed most powerfully in recent scholarship by John 
A. Scott’s monograph Dante’s Political Purgatory.1 First, it proposes a new way to 
read the poem as informed by Dante’s dualistic theory which does not entail a 
forced reading of  Purgatory in overly political terms. Secondly, it demonstrates 
how Dante forged his vision of  Purgatory through two areas of  distinctively 
Christian theory and practice which had risen to particular prominence in the 
thirteenth century: the newly crystallized doctrine of  Purgatory and the tradition 
of  the seven capital vices (or deadly sins) in penitential ethics.2 Thirdly, it argues 
that the region embodies an explicit reorientation from natural to supernatural 
ethics, from pagan to Christian exempla, and from this world to the heavenly 
city. Where Scott has argued for a ‘political Purgatory’, an ethical journey guided 
by ‘justice and the teachings of  philosophy’ towards a secular goal, this article 
presents afresh, therefore, a ‘theological Purgatory’, a moral pilgrimage guided 
by distinctively Christian ethics towards God and the beatitudo vitae aeternae.3
Reading the ‘Commedia’ in dualistic terms
According to Dante’s dualistic theory – elucidated most explicitly in his Latin 
prose work the Monarchia – man has two ethical journeys in this life: a journey 
to a secular happiness achievable through following the teachings of  the 
philosophers and the natural virtues (the domain of  the Holy Roman Empire 
and temporal power); and a journey to an eternal beatitude achievable through 
following the teachings of  divine revelation and the theological virtues (the 
domain of  the Church and spiritual power).4 Dante’s distinction between the 
lex naturalis and the lex divina, although not ubiquitous in thirteenth-century 
thought, is a feature of  those scholastic authors committed to the recuperation 
of  neo-Aristotelian philosophy.5 But whereas St Thomas Aquinas, for example, 
integrates and subordinates the order of  nature to the order of  grace, Dante’s 
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strategy of  two autonomous ethical goals emphasizes distinction and separation 
rather than integration.6 This leads to three problematic ethical implications: it 
potentially relegates the function of  Christianity solely to man’s eternal destiny 
in the next life; the intrinsic perfectibility of  human nature appears to render 
‘healing grace’ (gratia sanans) redundant, with the implication that only ‘elevating 
grace’ (gratia elevans) is theoretically necessary for man; and it establishes a 
dichotomy and tension between man’s pursuit of  an earthly goal and his, 
apparently competing, pursuit of  an eternal goal.7 The political ramifications 
are correspondingly problematic. Where other Christian-Aristotelian authors 
advocated a progressive via media which mediated between temporal and spiritual 
power, Dante takes the distinction between homo naturalis and homo Christianus to 
an extreme.8 He thereby justifies the autonomy of  empire and Church which, 
in his view, independently derive their authority directly from God. Dante’s 
radical dualism, particularly given the extreme theocratic pretensions of  the 
contemporary papacy, could not but suﬀer rebuke.9 Only six years after Dante’s 
death, the Monarchia suﬀered a rebuttal by the Dominican Guido Vernani; 
two years later, in 1329, it was publicly burned by the Pope’s representative in 
northern Italy, and it was subsequently placed, in 1554, on the Vatican index of  
prohibited books, only to be removed in 1881.10 
 It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that a dualistic reading of  Dante’s 
Commedia is a relatively recent phenomenon. The early commentators and 
readers, right up to the twentieth century, show little regard for the Monarchia 
(with only limited reading of  the Convivio) – and little attention to Dante’s 
dualism – in their interpretation of  the poem’s moral structure. Leaving aside the 
restricted early readership of  the Monarchia and the Convivio, it is understandable 
that the early Dante enthusiasts who commented on his poem, the first of  whom 
included his sons Pietro and Jacopo d’Alighieri, shied away from reading the 
Commedia in light of  this extreme dualism.11 But even much of  twentieth-century 
Dante scholarship, with scarce need to protect Dante’s poem in this way, sought 
nonetheless to limit this dualism to Dante’s Latin and vernacular prose works 
(marginalized as chronologically earlier ‘minor works’). Thus Bruno Nardi, a 
dominant scholar in this tradition, claimed that ‘In the Commedia there is no more 
trace of  the “two final ends” of  the Monarchia.’12 Kenelm Foster and Étienne 
Gilson, acute readers of  philosophical heterodoxy in Dante’s prose works, were 
still keen to emphasize that ‘the Comedy is quite another matter’, and that its 
subject ‘is theological – the final aims of  man (ultima regna)’.13 The compositional 
chronology underlining this view – that Dante’s Monarchia represents a dualistic 
stage in his intellectual trajectory that the poet left behind when he began 
writing the Commedia – has, however, been systematically refuted by modern 
philological evidence which dates the Monarchia to the last few years of  his life 
when the greater part of  the Commedia was already written. Prue Shaw has argued 
convincingly that ‘there seems no good reason to doubt’ the authenticity of  ‘the 
cross-reference in Book I to the Paradiso’ and, therefore, that the Monarchia was 
written ‘certainly no earlier than 1314 and possibly [during] the very last years 
of  its author’s life’.14 Further recent historical and contextual arguments have 
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corroborated Shaw’s thesis. They have narrowed the dating of  the Monarchia to 
after 1316 and, most probably, to the years 1317–18.15
 This new evidence has encouraged a dualistic reappraisal of  the poem and, 
also, a revision of  the dominant critical approach which tended to view the 
relationship between Dante’s prose works and the Commedia in terms of  authorial 
palinode.16 At this important interpretative juncture, however, I believe that 
Dante criticism has taken a wrong turn. Scholars who have tried to read the 
Commedia in light of  Dante’s dualism have simply equated the secular happiness 
– the paradisus terrestris delineated in the Monarchia – with the Earthly Paradise at 
the summit of  Mount Purgatory. Thus John A. Scott correctly observes that ‘all 
too often, Dante’s poem has been regarded exclusively as a spiritual ascent to 
God, thus ignoring the totality of  the poet’s message, which is bent on leading 
humanity to both its goals, the one set firmly in this world (Virgil/Emperor 
→ Earthly Paradise) and the other providing salvation and eternal beatitude’.17 
However, he jumps to what is, in my view, the wrong conclusion: ‘the answers, 
obvious as they are, need to be stated: yes, the Earthly Paradise is indeed to be 
found there, situated above Purgatory proper, and it is Virgil, the Aristotelianized 
poet of  imperial Rome, who guides Dante there.’18 On this reading, the summit 
of  Dante’s Purgatory represents not spiritual beatitude but rather secular, 
earthly happiness: ‘that very same Earthly Paradise, which for Dante reflected 
the happiness attainable through Justice and the teachings of  philosophy.’19 
 As Nicola Fosca points out, a reading which equates the secular goal of  
Dante’s Monarchia with the Earthly Paradise at the summit of  Purgatory is held 
by ‘molti dantisti’ and sustained by the authoritative Bosco-Reggio and Chiavacci 
Leonardi commentaries. She concludes not unreasonably that the Monarchia has 
had, thus far, a negative influence on the exegesis of  the Commedia.20 Scott’s 
own argument draws, in particular, on the thesis of  Charles S. Singleton, an 
influential earlier twentieth-century proponent of  a similar dualistic reading. 
Like Scott, Singleton argues that Dante-character on reaching the summit of  
Mount Purgatory attains only the ‘rule of  reason over the lower parts of  the 
soul, of  which Aristotle and Plato spoke’.21 Singleton also similarly maps the 
scheme of  the Monarchia onto the Mount of  Purgatory: ‘For in the poem is 
not Eden the first goal, and does Virgil not guide to Eden by the natural light 
of  the philosophers? … is not the celestial paradise the end to which Beatrice 
leads, as the light of  grace and revelation … ? So that here too, in respect to the 
second goal, treatise and poem would seem to agree.’22 Nonetheless Singleton 
recognizes a flaw in such simple mapping: in the poem, unlike in the treatise, the 
first path is clearly subordinated to the second and leads to Beatrice.23 Singleton 
is thereby constrained to present two Edens: in the Earthly Paradise, Leah and 
Rachel initially represent the active and contemplative aspects of  a happiness 
attainable through natural philosophy (and the guidance of  Virgil); they are 
then transfigured on the arrival of  Beatrice: ‘Virgil leads to a justice which the 
philosophers had discerned and he leads no further. Then beyond the stream, 
with Beatrice, come the four virtues which are the true perfection of  the active 
life, that is, true justice. A Leah who is a perfected Leah thus comes with Beatrice. 
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And so it must be with contemplation.’24 Awkward interpretative complications 
thereby appear in what – at first – might seem an ‘obvious’ reading. 
 Dualistic readings which equate the Earthly Paradise of  Purgatory with the 
secular happiness delineated in the Monarchia, furthermore, have led to some 
interpretations entirely at odds with the commentary and critical traditions. 
Thus Peter Armour’s reinterpretation of  the griﬃn (traditionally identified as a 
figure for Christ) as the ‘supreme temporal guide of  mankind on earth … the 
Empire alone, the Empire of  Rome’ is underpinned by his conviction that the 
Earthly Paradise in Purgatory depicts ‘the first of  mankind’s two God-given 
goals – that happiness in this life which, as every reader of  Dante knows, is not 
in his opinion in any way within the sphere of  competence of  the Church’.25 
John A. Scott, in similar vein, berates the Enciclopedia Dantesca which ‘still reports 
that “All the commentators, both ancient and modern, are agreed in recognizing 
Jesus Christ in the griﬃn”’.26 But Scott’s motive for a diﬀerent interpretation is 
similarly underpinned by his identification of  the Earthly Paradise at the summit 
of  Purgatory with Dante’s secular goal: ‘It would surely have been strange if, 
in that very same Earthly Paradise, which for Dante reflected the happiness 
attainable through Justice and the teachings of  philosophy, the poet had placed 
no signifier of  the imperial oﬃce and its divinely appointed mission to guide the 
human race, humana civitas, to the beatitudo huius vitae.’27 For it is not at all strange 
if  the Earthly Paradise at the summit of  Purgatory is not the ‘very same Earthly 
Paradise’ depicted in the Monarchia. Far from being obvious, Scott’s dualistic 
reading requires an interpretation at odds both with the wider medieval context 
and with the commentary tradition of  the Purgatorio.28 
 There is nonetheless another way to read the poem in dualistic terms which 
does not entail such revision of  traditional interpretations of  Purgatory. I 
would argue that Dante’s Commedia is indeed underpinned by his dualistic 
theory but that Dante represents man’s secular goal not in the Earthly Paradise 
at the summit of  Purgatory but rather in his theologically original limbo of  
the virtuous pagans (Inferno, iv.67–151). In the Monarchia, Dante depicts man’s 
path to his temporal goal as directed by philosophical teachings which are to be 
put into practice through the moral and intellectual virtues (‘per phylosophica 
documenta venimus, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et 
intellectuales operando’ (Mon., III.xv.8)). The early commentators of  Inferno 
iv unanimously interpret the seven walls encircling the noble castle of  Dante’s 
limbo to allegorically represent philosophical teaching (most commonly the 
seven liberal arts) by which the rational soul liberates itself  from the sensual 
appetite.29 Dante-character then encounters, within a beautiful landscape which 
directly alludes to Virgil’s Elysian fields, exemplars of  the moral and intellectual 
virtues. The first noble pagan named is Electra, the mythical founder of  Troy 
and the root of  the Trojan and Roman race which, for Dante, historically 
instantiates the true flower of  moral virtue.30 Amongst the ‘spiriti magni’ of  
the ‘filosofica familia’, Aristotle – the philosopher and the exemplar of  human 
intellectual perfection – holds reign: ‘il maestro di color che sanno’ (Inferno, 
iv.119–32). Dante thereby represents the happiness of  this life (‘beatitudinem 
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scilicet huius vite’) which consists in man’s natural perfection in its active and 
contemplative aspects, the operation of  the moral and intellectual virtues 
(‘virtutes morales et intellectuales operando’).31
 Scholars heretofore have tended to start from the Commedia and then either, 
like Nardi, fail to see any trace of  the dualism of  the Monarchia or, like Scott, 
project Dante’s dualistic theory of  two ethical goals on to the – apparently 
obvious – two end-points of  Dante-character’s journey: the Earthly Paradise 
at the summit of  Purgatory, and Paradise itself. However if, by contrast, we 
consider Dante-poet – fully committed to a dualistic vision of  man’s two 
ethical goals (as the later dating of  the Monarchia confirms) – setting out to 
write the Commedia, we can easily imagine him confronted with a stark problem 
and paradox: how to represent a secular, this-worldly goal in a poem which 
depicts an other-worldly afterlife? In this light, Dante’s innovative creation of  
the region of  the virtuous pagans becomes clearly understandable. Regardless 
of  their literal destiny and apparently unjustified deprivation of  beatitude (the 
undeniably important focus of  most scholarly work on this area of  limbo), the 
virtuous pagans serve, for Dante, a far more urgent allegorical purpose because 
they respond precisely to this critical exigency. That is, Dante uses the historical 
figure of  the virtuous pagan – to whom the spiritual goal, divine revelation, and 
the institutional Church were of  course unavailable – to figuratively represent 
secular human flourishing in a poem which literally depicts the afterlife. 
 Political readings of  Purgatory in terms of  philosophical principles have 
been motivated, at least in part, by the attempt to map Dante’s dualistic 
theory onto the eschatology of  the Commedia. Even on their own terms, such 
dualistic readings – where the secular goal of  Dante’s Monarchia is equated with 
the Earthly Paradise at the summit of  Purgatory – seem forced into internal 
contradictions and to yield some rather peculiar, or at the least untraditional, 
interpretations. By contrast, I have presented an alternative dualistic reading in 
which Dante’s limbo of  the virtuous pagans figuratively embodies this-worldly, 
ethical flourishing (the temporal goal of  the Monarchia). This interpretation has 
two distinct advantages: first it enables us to read the poem as informed by 
Dante’s dualistic vision. Particularly in light of  the recent philological evidence, 
the thesis of  a radical shift in Dante’s intellectual trajectory away from a dualistic 
ethical outlook seems now unsustainable. It does, therefore, appear necessary 
to account in some way for the doctrine of  two ethical goals (so prominent 
in the Monarchia) in the Commedia. The second advantage of  this alternative 
dualistic interpretation is that it nonetheless defends more traditional readings 
of  Purgatory. The interpretation of  Dante’s limbo of  the virtuous pagans, at 
the rim of  Hell, as depicting Dante’s this-worldly goal frees Purgatory and the 
Earthly Paradise from a forced, overly secular interpretation. 
 The first stage of  the argument thereby removes one key obstacle to reading 
Purgatory in terms of  Christian ethics: by providing an alternative location (the 
limbo of  the virtuous pagans) for Dante’s this-worldly goal, it shows how one 
can read the poem as informed by Dante’s dualistic theory without reading 
the ethics of  Purgatory as narrowly philosophical. The second stage of  the 
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argument takes a diﬀerent tack: a re-examination of  the immediate context of  
and inspiration for the genesis of  Dante’s Purgatory. In this way, I show how 
the moral and doctrinal context of  the region’s ethics is distinctively Christian 
and cannot be viewed within the frame of  philosophical principles.
The genesis of  Dante’s Purgatory
An overemphasis on the originality of  Dante’s vision of  Purgatory may initially 
obscure an interpretation of  its moral structure. After all, were we to imagine 
that Dante invented his depiction of  Purgatory in isolation, his structuring it 
according to philosophical principles could be understood as consistent with 
the region’s audacious novelty as a whole. There is, of  course, clear evidence of  
originality. Before Dante, the doctrine of  Purgatory was not only relatively new 
but, in Jeﬀrey Schnapp’s words, ‘little more than a theologian’s abstraction’.32 By 
contrast, Dante gave Purgatory a precise geographical location – in the southern 
hemisphere at the antipodes of  Jerusalem. Moreover, he drew a completely new 
image of  what this eschatological region of  Purgatory might be like: not simply 
a monochrome corporeal fire but a mountain divided into diﬀerent regions with 
diﬀerent punishments.33 However, there is also much content which per se is 
not original at all. If  we were to recast the moral framework and much of  the 
doctrinal material of  Dante’s Purgatory into another medieval genre – not as a 
vision of  the afterlife realm of  Purgatory but as a treatise on Christian ethics, 
a homiletic handbook, or an allegorical moral journey set in this life – it would 
appear much more familiar. That is, there are clearly discernible contexts which 
Dante uses in constructing the moral and doctrinal structure of  Purgatory. I 
shall examine two of  these contexts in turn: first, the newly crystallized doctrine 
of  Purgatory and, secondly, the well-established resources of  the tradition of  
the seven capital vices in medieval Christian ethics. 
 Although the Church had only given an oﬃcial stamp to the doctrine of  
Purgatory at the Council of  Lyon in 1274, the existence of  an intermediate 
realm, between Hell and Paradise, was well established by Dante’s lifetime.34 At 
a practical level, the suﬀragia mortuorum (‘masses, prayers, alms and pious works 
by which the living assisted the souls of  the dead from purgatorial pains’) were 
integral to medieval religious life.35 At a theoretical level, medieval theologians 
– citing passages from Scripture stating that sins would be tested, punished, or 
cancelled by fire on the day of  judgment – had put the flesh and blood on the 
doctrine of  Purgatory. Outside vision literature, however, theological description 
of  the region remained distinctively unimaginative: a purgatorial fire. Aquinas, 
for example, gives a clear rationale for Purgatory. Mortal sin turns man away 
from God as his ultimate end. Through repentance, sinners are ‘brought back 
to the state of  charity, whereby they cleave to God as their last end’ and, freed 
from the eternal punishment of  Hell, they merit ‘eternal life’.36 Through venial 
sin man does not turn away from his ultimate end but does err with regard to 
the means leading him to God. Although venial sin may be expiated by the 
fervent divine love of  particularly holy souls, the general rule is that venial 
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sin, like mortal sin, retains the debt of  temporal punishment even after due 
repentance.37 The primary purpose of  penance, therefore, is to repay this debt. 
In addition, however, penance has a curative purpose: the sinner must be cured 
from vice and made virtuous and holy. What, then, of  a person who dies before 
being able to complete his or her penance? And what of  those, all bar the most 
exceptional saints, who die before becoming holy and virtuous if, as Aquinas 
states, ‘no one is admitted to the possession of  eternal life unless he is free 
from all sin and imperfection’?38 The afterlife region of  Purgatory responds, 
as a theological necessity, to both these questions: it completes the debt of  sin 
and it cleanses the soul of  imperfection. Where the intensity of  purgatorial 
punishment corresponds to the debt (the sinner’s guilt), the length corresponds 
to the soul’s imperfection (the ‘firmness with which sin has taken root in its 
subject’).39 The twofold pain of  Purgatory – the delay of  the divine vision 
(poena damni) and the corporeal fire (poena sensus) – is thus spiritually necessary. 
Furthermore, as with earthly penance, this satisfaction is desired by the souls 
as their means to restore friendship with God.40 
 Dante thereby inherited some key doctrinal points about Purgatory but, 
for its description, he inherited only a generic condition: the corporeal fire. 
This left him with considerable imaginative freedom to describe and structure 
his own depiction of  Purgatory. Why, then, did he choose the tradition of  
the seven capital vices? It seems at first glance an odd choice, as we might 
reasonably expect the seven vices to structure Dante’s Hell.41 But Dante does 
not structure Hell according to the vices: the vices of  pride, envy, and sloth 
are not mentioned explicitly at all in the Inferno, and the other four vices (lust, 
gluttony, avarice, and anger) are categorized, ostensibly in line with Aristotle’s 
Ethics, as sins of  incontinence, occupying just one part of  Hell (and only 
five of  thirty-four cantos).42 One principal reason for Dante’s choice is that 
the tradition of  the seven capital vices had come to play a dominant role in 
thirteenth-century Christian ethics, homilies, and confessional practices.43 In 
response to the renewed emphasis on confession at the fourth Lateran Council 
(1215–16), preachers found in the theory of  the seven capital vices a popular 
and psychologically productive approach to moral evil.44 The scheme is both 
simple for a beginner and immensely rich in terms of  psychological depth and 
complexity. The focus is not only on sins committed but, crucially, on character 
traits or tendencies which need to be corrected in the Christian’s moral journey 
in this life.45 It is natural to suppose that many Christians (Dante included) 
may have structured their own confessions through this morally transformative 
scheme.46 Dante could draw on direct literary precedents such as Brunetto 
Latini’s Il tesoretto which, like the Commedia, begins in the wood of  sin and closes 
with the author confessing the seven capital sins in causal order and admonishing 
his reader to do the same.47 There were also widely diﬀused treatises on the vices 
such as those by Aquinas and, arguably most significantly, William Peraldus.48 
Moreover, the vices (and corresponding sets of  virtues) were central to the 
popular Christianity of  Dante’s immediate cultural context, as is clear from 
model sermons of  the time or the ethical use of  the vices in visual culture.49 For 
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example, Alain de Lille’s outline of  the appropriate content (faith and morals), 
audience (public), and material (the use of  authorities) in preaching, his emphasis 
on the use of  examples (which make doctrine more familiar and, thereby, more 
eﬃcacious), and his chapters on each of  the vices and corresponding virtues in 
the overarching context of  Christian confession and penitence provide a telling 
parallel with Dante’s approach in the Purgatory.50
 In light of  this wider context, we can readily understand why the penitential 
tradition on the vices appealed to Dante as he envisaged the terraces of  Purgatory 
and not when he organized the circles of  Hell. For penance makes sense of  three 
key doctrinal purposes of  Purgatory: first, it realigns the soul from a disordered 
pursuit of  earthly goods to God as its ultimate end; secondly, it repays the debt 
for sin; thirdly, it frees the soul from all vice and imperfection. These purposes 
are equally true of  the purgatorial afterlife as of  Christian penance in this life (for 
which there was an extensive literature).51 Dante, therefore, projects the familiar 
ethical material on the seven capital vices onto the entirely unfamiliar context 
of  Purgatory. The result is, at a literal level, the vivid depiction of  an otherwise 
uncharted eschatological region – Purgatory – and, at an allegorical level, the 
representation of  Dante’s Christian ethics: the very guidance on an individual’s 
journey to spiritual salvation which Dante felt the institutional Church of  his 
time, misdirected by its grasp of  temporal power, was failing to administer. 
 The principal moral context underlying Dante’s vision of  Purgatory is, 
therefore, Christian penance. Purgatory literally depicts the purging of  those 
dead souls who merit salvation, but it also allegorically depicts the penitential 
journey which every Christian should undergo in this life. This Christian context 
strongly suggests that Dante’s Purgatory is anything but a philosophically guided 
journey to a temporal happiness ‘of  which Aristotle and Plato spoke’. The third 
and final stage of  the argument, then, addresses Dante’s description of  the moral 
order underpinning Purgatory in the poem itself. I show that Purgatory’s moral 
order is explicitly governed by Christian teachings which entirely surpass the 
natural law; it is thus inconceivable in terms of  narrowly philosophical principles.
The moral order of  Dante’s Purgatory
Dante-poet saves his doctrinal explanation of  Purgatory for the arrival of  
Dante-character and Virgil at the terrace of  sloth at nightfall. As the region 
cannot be climbed without the light of  the sun (allegorically without the grace 
of  God), dusk necessitates a pause in their journey. The moral lesson thereby 
occurs at the central terrace of  Purgatory and at the centre of  the poem as 
a whole. The very fact that the speaker is Virgil, rather than Beatrice, has 
led many Dante scholars to conclude that the moral doctrine he espouses is 
philosophical.52 Such a view had previously been strengthened by the lack of  a 
direct source for Dante’s apparently original organization of  the vices. Siegfried 
Wenzel convincingly showed, however, that Pietro d’Alighieri’s commentary 
– elucidating this passage of  the poem – quotes, almost word for word, the 
innovative treatise by the Domincan Peraldus on the vices which employs 
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the exact same organizing principle.53 Despite Wenzel’s intervention, which 
locates the discourse within the context of  penitential Christian ethics, the view 
nonetheless persists that the doctrine espoused by Virgil is within the bounds of  
pagan thought.54 Leaving aside the issue of  the speaker (Virgil), let us contest 
this view on the basis of  the discourse itself. 
 Dante sets the entire discourse on the vices within the overarching context 
of  the relationship of  love between the creator and his creation, between God 
(‘l fattore’) and man (‘sua fattura’). The ethical principle is that each soul, created 
by God, has an inbuilt desire to return to him, a principle epitomized by the 
opening of  Augustine’s Confessions: ‘fecisti nos, Domine, ad te, et inquietum 
est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te’ (‘God, you made us for you, and our 
hearts are restless until they rest in you’).55 As Dante highlights through the 
voice of  Marco Lombardo in the previous canto, however, each soul is created 
in simplicity and ignorance and is thereby easily led astray by lesser goods from 
God (its chief  good):
 Esce di mano a lui che la vagheggia
prima che sia, a guisa di fanciulla
che piangendo e ridendo pargoleggia,
 l’anima semplicetta, che sa nulla,
salvo che, mossa da lieto fattore,
volontier torna a ciò che la trastulla.
 Di picciol bene in pria sente sapore;
quivi s’inganna, e dietro ad esso corre
se guida o fren non torce suo amore. (Purgatorio, xvi.85–93)
 (From the hand of  him who desires it before it 
exists, like a little girl who weeps and laughs childishly,
 the simple little soul comes forth, knowing nothing except that,
set in motion by a happy Maker, it gladly turns to what amuses it
 Of  some lesser good it first tastes the flavour; there it is deceived 
and runs after it, if  a guide or rein does not turn away its love.) 
Dante states that the soul’s love can be disordered in two main ways: the love of  
an evil (‘per male obietto’) or the unmeasured love of  a good (‘o per troppo o 
per poco di vigore’).56 Having established that the evil loved cannot be directed 
against one self  or against God, Dante concludes that it must be directed against 
one’s neigh bour. Pride, envy, and anger are thus understood as three ways by 
which we come to love the evil of, which is to hate, our neighbour. Dante locates 
the origin of  the other four capital vices in the second kind of  disordered love 
whereby the soul does not love its neighbour’s evil but, rather, seeks the chief  
good in a defective manner (with too much or too little vigour). Sloth is not 
laziness per se, therefore, but the distinctive failure to suﬃciently love God: it 
is unmeasured love by deficiency. The final three vices – avarice, gluttony, and 
lust – are forms of  excessive love for lesser goods none of  which can fulfil 
man’s deepest desire for God. 
 The ethical scheme of  Purgatory is emphatically not, therefore, according to 
the teachings of  philosophy (‘phylosophica documenta’).57 Rather, the end is love 
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of  God and neighbour (the two commandments by which Jesus sums up the 
Divine Law), and the souls are directed from the earthly to the heavenly city.58 
Indeed, as Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount counterpoises our earthly life with God’s 
kingdom, so, on Mount Purgatory, the beatitudes provide spiritual nourishment 
for the penitent souls and direct them to the eternal happiness in the life to 
come.59 As the philosopher Ralph McInerny, commenting on Dante’s use of  the 
beatitudes, aﬃrms: ‘Jesus begins his sermon with the beatitudes. One cannot 
think of  a more dramatic way of  showing that the New Law is not the Old Law, 
nor is it simply a repetition of  the teaching of  philosophers. The beatitudes fly 
in the face of  our natural assumptions about human life … Far from being a 
distillation of  natural moral wisdom, the Sermon on the Mount seems to stand 
natural wisdom on its head.’60 McInerny highlights the ‘enormous diﬀerence’ 
between ‘morality or ethics – philosophical or natural accounts of  how life 
should be led’ and ‘Christian revelation’, between the broadly philosophical 
organization of  Dante’s Inferno and the distinctively Christian ethics of  the 
Purgatory.61 
 This ethical reorientation from the secular to the spiritual is evident from the 
first two terraces which purge the gravest vices of  pride and envy: 
 È chi, per esser suo vicin soppresso,
spera eccellenza, e sol per questo brama
ch’el sia di sua grandezza in basso messo;
 è chi podere, grazia, onore e fama
teme di perder perch’altri sormonti,
onde s’attrista sì che ’l contrario ama. (Purgatorio, xvii.115–20)
(There are those who hope for supremacy through their neighbour’s being kept 
down, and only on this account desire that his greatness be brought low; there are 
those who fear to lose power, favour, honour, or fame because another mounts 
higher, and thus are so aggrieved that they love the contrary.)
The proud pursue excellence not to magnify God like Mary but, rather, to exalt 
themselves and to put down their neighbour: the ‘superbus’ literally wants to 
walk above others (‘nam superbire non est aliud, quam super alios velle ire’).62 
The envious are saddened by the excellence of  others lest it diminish their 
own and, instead of  desiring good for their neighbour (as Mary desires that 
there be more wine at the Marriage of  Cana), they take pleasure (spite) in their 
neighbour’s failures and misfortune. In both cases, the end is hatred of  one’s 
neighbour. Crucially, the root of  pride and envy is the competitive pursuit of  
temporal goods and status. Indeed, Dante links pride and envy by listing four 
kinds of  earthly things – power, favour or fortune, honour, and fame – by 
which people may measure themselves against others. As such temporal goods 
are finite, our own pursuit of  them implies that our neighbour will have less 
(which may lead to pride: the desire to put down one’s neighbour) while our 
neighbour’s pursuit of  them implies that we will have less (which may lead to 
envy: the sadness at one’s neighbour’s good). As Guido del Duca exclaims in 
the terrace of  envy, ‘O gente umana perché poni ’l core / là ’v è mestier di 
consorte divieto?’ (‘O human race, why do you set your heart where sharing 
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must be forbidden?’).63 By contrast, spiritual goods multiply the more they are 
shared. Thus truth, goodness, or love do not become less in being shared but, 
like a ray of  light in a mirror, increase in each person.64 
 Freedom from these twin vices is only possible, therefore, when the soul is 
directed away from the competitive pursuit of  secular attainments and, instead, 
towards God as its ultimate end. Having witnessed the proud souls bent over 
double by massive boulders, Dante exclaims:
 O superbi cristian, miseri lassi
che, de la vista de la mente infermi,
fidanza avete ne’ retrosi passi,
 non v’accorgete voi che noi siam vermi
nati a formar l’angelica farfalla
che vola a la giustizia sanza schermi?
 Di che l’animo vostro in alto galla,
poi siete quasi antomata in difetto,
sì come vermo in cui formazion falla? (Purgatorio, x.121–9)
 (O proud Christians, weary wretches, who, weak in mental 
vision, put your faith in backward steps,
 do you not perceive that we are worms born to form the 
angelic butterfly that flies to justice without a shield?
 Why is it that your spirit floats on high, since you are like
defective insects, like worms in whom formation is lacking?) 
Dante encounters Omberto Aldobrandesco who took pride in the past (his 
noble ancestors); Provenan Salvanti who took pride in the present (his political 
dominance of  Siena), and Oderisi who took pride in the future (his artistic glory). 
All this pride is short-sighted – the proud are ‘weak in mental vision’ – because 
beyond the corruptible world in time (subject to past, present, and future) is the 
eternal perfection of  the heavenly city. As Sapia reminds Dante in the terrace of  
envy, she was only a pilgrim in Italy because everyone is a citizen of  the true city: 
‘ciascuna è cittadina / d’una vera città’.65 Christians, therefore, must not place 
their hope in earthly prowess and happiness (their ‘backward steps’).66 Nothing 
by which a person may puﬀ himself  up in this life will avail the immortal soul 
(the butterfly) which must leave its corruptible body (the chrysalis) at death and 
return to its creator for judgment. Men, pilgrims in this life, should thus fix their 
sight on their immortal destiny and fly to God, rather than remain defective in 
the pride of  the flesh (‘like worms in whom formation is lacking’).67
 The early commentators emphasize that Dante’s invective against the ‘proud 
Christians’ underscores the fact that the realm of  Purgatory (and the Christian 
pilgrimage of  penitence in this life) is explicitly unavailable to pagans.68 This 
ethical direction, furthermore, would be completely alien and irrational from a 
pagan perspective as its demands surpass, and contradict, the requirements of  
the natural law. When it comes to the disordered love of  lesser goods (avarice, 
gluttony, and lust), the souls in Purgatory are not directed to a virtuous mean as 
in natural ethics but to the supernatural ethical goals of  poverty, abstinence, and 
chastity. Furthermore, the souls’ ultimate goal is not intellectual contemplation 
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of  the truth (the speculative perfection of  Aristotelian ethics) but, through 
embracing the cross and suﬀering of  Christ, the union of  the soul (intellect and 
will) with God in the beatific vision. 
 Notably, Virgil’s doctrinal speech at the centre of  the canticle does not give 
a specific explanation of  the quiddity of  the three vices of  excess ostensibly 
because it is good for Dante-character, countering sloth, to discover it for 
himself.69 But this delay also allows Dante-poet, with typically caustic irony, to 
save the explanation of  avarice for Pope Adrian V (Pope between 12 July and 
his death on 18 August 1276). The medieval papacy’s avaricious assumption of  
temporal power was, for Dante, the principal institutional cause of  moral evil in 
the society of  his own day, and it undermined his firm conviction that temporal 
and spiritual power should be divided between empire and Church. That a pope 
– whose exclusive duty, according to Dante, was to lead mankind to God (his 
spiritual goal) – should therefore be the mouthpiece for this most-worldly vice 
plays into his contemporary dualistic polemic. But it also serves an important 
moral purpose. For Adrian V, in Dante’s account, converted from unrelenting 
avarice to God only on assuming the papal throne! Only, that is, on reaching the 
highest possible station attainable in the medieval world (the earthly city) does 
Adrian V recognize the vanity of  temporal goods (that they cannot satisfy his 
desire) and begin to love the heavenly city: 
 La mia conversïone, omè! fu tarda;
ma, come fatto fui roman pastore,
così scopersi la vita bugiarda.
 Vidi che lì non s’acquetava il core,
né più salir potiesi in quella vita
per che di questa in me s’accese amore.
 Fino a quel punto misera e partita
da Dio anima fui, del tutto avara;
or, come vedi, qui ne son punita. (Purgatorio, xix.106–14)
 (My conversion, alas! was late, but, when I became 
the Roman shepherd, then I discovered life to be deceptive.
 I saw that my heart was not quieted there, nor could I rise 
any higher in that life: thus was kindled in me the love of  this one.
 Until that point I was a wretched soul separated from God,
 entirely greedy; now, as you see, I am punished for it here.)
The message for the ordinary Christian is clear: even the highest power, wealth, 
and prestige (as achieved by a corrupt medieval pope) will not fulfil your desire.70 
Rather, such temporal acquisitiveness will separate you from God (the true 
object of  human desire) and lead to wretchedness. The further key point, equally 
for the institutional Church as for the individual Christian, is that the way to God 
– the corresponding virtue to avarice – is not the prudent or just distribution 
of  temporal goods (appropriate to the secular sphere of  conduct) but, rather, 
radical temporal poverty. The souls are directed to the extreme poverty of  Mary: 
‘Povera fosti tanto / quanto veder si può per quello ospizio / dove sponesti il 
tuo portato santo.’ (‘How very poor you were we can see by the shelter where 
278	 MEDIUM ÆVUM LXXXIII.2
you laid down your holy burden.’)71 Poverty, to be spurned according to natural 
ethics, must be actively desired by those seeking the kingdom of  Heaven. Pope 
Adrian V explains that avarice had extinguished his love for every good: his 
soul, fixed down on earthly things (‘le cose terrene’), had been unable to taste 
heavenly things (‘in alto’).72 By contrast, St Francis took Lady Poverty as his bride 
opening up an ever increasing divine love: he was, as Dante states in Paradiso, 
seraphic in love (‘serafico in ardore’).73 
 The overarching Christian ethical re-direction from natural to supernatural 
ethics is further emphasized in the ensuing description of  gluttony. In Hell, the 
blind intemperance of  gluttony (the failure of  reason to moderate the appetite 
to the food necessary for a person’s health) is eternally punished. In Purgatory, 
however, the souls are directed to a completely diﬀerent moral order. The goal 
here is not bodily health (as a constituent of  human flourishing) but, rather, 
holiness (‘qui si rifà santa’).74 The weeping souls sing the verse ‘Labia mea, 
Domine’ of  the penitential psalm Miserere – their lips are directed from the 
satisfaction of  sensual appetite to the praise of  God (‘et os meum annuntiabit 
laudem tuam’). The souls in Purgatory endure an enforced fast: they circle a 
tree whose fruits, unreachable, nonetheless let oﬀ a powerful scent intensifying 
their hunger and thirst. Their faces are so dark, hollow, and wasted that the 
skin is shaped by their bones; their eye-sockets are like rings without gems and, 
framing an emaciated nose, clearly spell ‘omo’ [man].75 This is hardly re-adjusting 
to the Aristotelian virtuous mean with regard to eating and drinking!76 Rather 
this extreme bodily fasting leads the souls – entirely over and above the order 
of  natural ethics – to spiritual union with Christ:
 
 E non pur una volta, questo spazzo
girando, si rinfresca nostra pena:
io dico pena e dovria dir solazzo,
 ché quella voglia a li alberi ci mena
che menò Cristo lieto a dire ‘Elì,’
quando ne liberò con la sua vena. (Purgatorio, xxiii.70–5)
 (And not just once, as we circle this space, is our pain renewed:
I say pain, and I should say solace,
 for that desire leads us to the tree that led Christ to say ‘Eli’ gladly,
when he freed us with the blood of  his veins.)
Despite the extreme agony and the humiliation of  the cross (according to his 
human nature), Christ joyfully cries ‘Eli’ (Father) and submits to the divine will 
because of  his love for mankind (redeemed through his sacrifice). Likewise, 
the penitent souls intensely desire to come to the heavenly city and, as the 
pain (their cross) is the means to their eternal salvation, it is now – for them – 
solace.77 In Dante’s geographical symbolism, the penitents join themselves to 
Christ’s cross in Purgatory at the exact antipodes of  Jerusalem, the place of  
Christ’s crucifixion. It is Christ, therefore, who provides the moral order of  
Purgatory. The souls, inspired by the promise of  the beatitudes and embracing 
their penitential suﬀering, are made ready for the kingdom of  God. And these 
souls in Purgatory are explicitly compared to pilgrims (‘i peregrin pensosi’) 
 THE CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF DANTE’S PURGATORY 279
who, in this life, must do penance of  abstinence and fasting for the sake of  the 
heavenly kingdom.78
 The ethical scheme of  Dante’s Purgatory is, therefore, distinctively Christian. 
The new law of  the beatitudes which governs Purgatory stands natural ethics 
on its head. The souls in Purgatory are explicitly directed away from secular, 
this-worldly goods or aspirations. Instead, the souls are exhorted to embrace the 
higher demands of  Christ’s law which may involve practices, such as extreme 
poverty or fasting, which completely surpass the philosophical rule of  the 
virtuous mean. 
I have argued that the interpretation of  a ‘Political Purgatory’ in terms of  
philosophical principles represents a false turning in twentieth-century Dante 
scholarship. The motivation for such a reading, at least in part, is the desire to 
interpret the poem through Dante’s dualistic theory. Scholars who equate the 
secular, this-worldly goal described in the Monarchia with the Earthly Paradise 
at the summit of  Purgatory naturally seek to equate the philosophical guidance 
described in the Monarchia with the ethics of  the Purgatory. The first step in 
my argument, therefore, has been to dispute such a dualistic reading. In itself, 
this is not particularly new. After all, many scholars have considered that such a 
parallel is mistaken. But, in contrast to them, I have not thereby concluded that 
there is no evidence of  Dante’s dualistic theory in the Commedia, a conclusion 
that is all but untenable if, as the modern philological evidence suggests, there 
was no radical shift in Dante’s intellectual trajectory away from this theory by 
the time he wrote the Commedia. Rather, I have presented an alternative way to 
read the poem in dualistic terms. I have argued that Dante, with characteristic 
ingenuity, surmounts the apparent impossibility of  representing a this-worldly 
goal in a poem that depicts an other-worldly afterlife by using the virtuous 
pagan to figuratively represent secular human flourishing. The theologically 
original limbo of  the virtuous pagans represents the journey by philosophical 
teaching to moral and intellectual flourishing in this life. By contrast, Purgatory 
represents the spiritual journey to an eternal beatitude (beatitudo vitae aeternae). 
The immediate Christian context of  Dante’s depiction of  Purgatory reinforces 
this reading. The use of  the moral structure of  the seven capital vices in 
thirteenth-century penitential practice served perfectly the literal and moral 
purpose of  Dante’s Purgatory: it literally describes the temporal punishment and 
purification of  saved souls after death, and it allegorically represents the spiritual 
penance which must be undergone by all Christians on their pilgrimage to God 
in this life. The moral order of  Dante’s Purgatory is distinctively Christian and 
outside the purview of  philosophical principles and, thereby, further confirms 
this interpretation. The souls in Purgatory are directed from the secular goal of  
natural ethics to the supernatural goal of  the heavenly city; from the virtuous 
mean to the demands of  supernatural law. A revised dualistic interpretation of  
the poem as a whole, an examination of  the immediate contexts of  Dante’s 
vision of  Purgatory, and a re-reading of  its moral order, therefore, not only 
serve to counter an interpretation of  the Purgatory in terms of  philosophical 
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principles, but also provide powerful arguments for upholding the traditional 
interpretation of  the region in terms of  Christian ethics.
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Squillacioti, Plinio Torri, and Sergio Vatteroni (Turin, 2007), II.131, pp. 628–30.
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by authors of  Latin and vernacular manuals on the sins and on confession’), it seems that 
Peraldus’ treatise was well diﬀused in Florence: it was one of  the ‘two wellsprings … of  
Dominican practical or moral theology’. Dante may even ‘have seen the Summa during 
his contacts with Dominican friars at Santa Maria Novella’ (‘Dante’s rationale’, p. 532). 
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101 (1984), 1–29; Sergio Cristaldi, ‘Dalle beatitudini all’Apocalisse: il Nuovo Testamento 
nella Commedia’, Lettere classensi, 17 (1988), 23–57; V. S. Benfell III, ‘“Blessed are they that 
hunger after justice”: from vice to beatitude in Dante’s Purgatorio’, in The Seven Deadly 
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65 La Divina Commedia: Purgatorio, xiii.94–6. 
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67 Augustine, In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus centum viginti quatuor, I. 13: ‘Omnes homines de 
carne nascentes, quid sunt nisi vermes? Et de vermibus [Deus] Angelos facit.’
68 Jacopo della Lana, gloss to La Divina Commedia: Purgatorio, x.121–3, Dartmouth Dante 
Project: ‘qui esclama contra la superbia, e dice in particolare cristiani, imperquello che 
d’altra legge non va in Purgatorio, con ciò sia che altra generazione non si può salvare’; 
Benvenuto da Imola, gloss to La Divina Commedia: Purgatorio, x.121–3, Dartmouth Dante 
Project: ‘Unde dicit: O superbi cristiani, notanter dicit christiani, quia infideles ad purgatorium 
non veniunt’; Francesco da Buti, gloss to La Divina Commedia: Purgatorio, x.121–9, 
Dartmouth Dante Project: ‘Dice così: O superbi cristian; ecco che dirissa lo parlare suo pure 
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70 See McInerny, Dante and the Blessed Virgin, p. 78: ‘Thomas Aquinas did hold … that 
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71 La Divina Commedia: Purgatorio, xx.22–4. 
72 La Divina Commedia: Purgatorio, xiv.115–23.
73 La Divina Commedia: Paradiso, xi.28–117 (37). While I was working on material for 
this article at the University of  Notre Dame, Zygmunt G. Barański gave a seminar in 
which he emphasized the strangeness (often passed over by scholars) of  Dante’s claim 
that St Francis was the second (after Christ himself) to embrace poverty (Par., xi.64–75). 
What about all the saints before him? I suggested that perhaps what, for Dante, set St 
Francis and his first community apart from, for example, the Benedictine order, was St 
Francis’s emphasis not only on individual but also on communal poverty. St Francis’s first 
congregation could not own material wealth (or its buildings) but was granted only the 
‘use’ of  it by the Church, a singular regulation nonetheless confirmed by Pope Nicholas 
III’s bull Exiit qui seminat (1279). It was only after Dante’s death that Pope John XXII’s 
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use, but not possession, of  wealth and buildings to the Church? This would seem to be 
the implication of  the strange theory of  the Emperor’s universal ownership expounded 
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the other extreme of  complete abstinence from food, hoping thereby to create a properly 
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of  virtuous habits’ (ibid., p. 202). However, this implies that the Aristotelian mean is the 
goal, whereas, as Benfell concedes, famous ascetics ‘are explicitly praised’ (ibid., p. 202). A 
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77 The agon embodied in Christ’s cry is a paradigmatic site, theologically, for the perfect 
union in Christ of  the human and the divine natures. For Christ’s forty-day fast in 
the desert demonstrated that his appetite was always obedient to his reason, while his 
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78 The early commentators, including Benvenuto, naturally compare such purgatorial pain 
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in this life. Benvenuto da Imola, gloss to La Divina Commedia: Purgatorio, xxiii.70–5, 
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hoc auxilium optant ab aliis.’ See also Pietro d’Alighieri, gloss to La Divina Commedia: 
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